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IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: THE INNOVATIVE NEW
DIRECTIVE
Leo J. Raskind*
The European Council Directive of May 14, 1991 entitled,
"On The Legal Protection of Computer Programs", (the Direc-
tive) announces a major development in this branch of copyright
law.' This Directive provides a framework of common principles
of software protection to govern the member nations of the Eco-
nomic Community. Its text reflects the culmination of an active
debate among copyright specialists about computer software
protection that was initiated by the publication of the earlier,
provisional statement in the Green Paper of 1988 (the Green Pa-
per).2 After the Council of the European Community adopted
the Directive, it acquired the force of law within the Commu-
nity, ordering compliance by January 1, 1993. A second conse-
quence of the promulgation of this Directive is the lively debate
that will ensue in the several national legislatures as each body
begins the task of interpreting and applying the general princi-
ples of the Directive to the legislative task of conforming the
copyright law of each State to the Community norms set out in
the Directive. The Directive warrants the attention of copyright
watchers outside the Community, for it presents an innovative
synthesis of various approaches to the principal problems in
software protection.
Recognition of the complexity and controversy raised by the
adaptation of traditional copyright doctrines to this new tech-
nology is reflected in the Preamble to the Directive (the Pream-
* Visiting Professor, Brooklyn Law School, I express my appreciation for the con-
structive comments from Jane C. Ginsburg and Richard H. Stern on an earlier draft.
1. Council Directive 91/250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991
O.J. (L 122) 45 [hereinafter Council Directive].
2. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Copyright and Chal-
lenge of Technology - Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, June 7, 1988,
COM(88)172 final [hereinafter Green Paper]. For the background of the evolution of the
several White Papers that set out the Internal European Market by January 1, 1993, see
Alfred P. Meijboom, Software Protection in 'Europe 1992,' 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 407 (1990); Robert J. Coleman, The 1991 Horace S. Manges Lecture - Intel-
lectual Property and the European Community After 1992, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
117 (1991).
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ble). Initially, there is the recognition of the distinctive nature of
computer software programs, as well as an appreciation of the
importance of the computer industry to the economic develop-
ment of the Community.3 Thus, the Preamble notes that the
production of software programs requires the investment of con-
siderable "human, technical, and financial resources that may be
appropriated by copying at a fraction of the costs of develop-
ment."4 The task of legislating copyright protection for software
also requires striking a balance between the economic incentive
of the author and the societal interest in promoting the develop-
ment of software. Finally, the implementation of the Directive
will necessarily modify the copyright law of member states by
reducing the essentially territorial character of copyright
protection.5
Substantial changes in the national laws of some member
states may be required by the Directive. Membership in the
Berne Convention' or the Universal Copyright Convention7 by
the member states of the Community requires only that the
copyright laws of the member states are not incompatible with
essential elements of the treaty provisions. For example, uni-
formity in the scope and duration of copyright protection is not
required for adherence to the Conventions. However, the Direc-
tive mandates harmonization of the copyright laws of the mem-
ber states in conformity with the Directive's stated norms. In
some member states, there are substantial differences between
the Directive and existing national law. For example, there are
differences in the threshold requirement of "originality" among
the German, French, and United Kingdom copyright laws, as
well as variations in the duration of protection, among other
differences.8
3. Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
4. Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
5. Arthur Fakes, The EEC's Directive on Software Protection and Its Moral Rights
Loophole, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 531 (1992); Andre Lucas, Copyright in the European Com-
munity: The Green Paper and the Prqposal for a Directive Concerning Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145 (1991); Mark P. Tellini, Note,
Uniform Copyright Protection for Computer Software in the EEC, 13 B.C. INT', &
COMP. L. REV. 483 (1990); Dennis Cline, Comment, Copyright Protection of Software in
the EEC: The Competing Policies Underlying Community and National Law and the
Case for Harmonization, 75 CAL. L. REv. 633 (1987).
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised July 27, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
7. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
8. Andre Lucas, The Council Directive of 14 May 1991 concerning the Legal Pro-
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The Directive also announces some innovative changes. The
Preamble seemingly accepts the practice of reverse engineering,
without ever using this phrase, by noting that the user of a com-
puter program may not be "prevented from performing acts nec-
essary to observe, study, or test the functioning of the pro-
gram."9  Limited acceptance of the practice of reverse
engineering is suggested by the reference to the need for "inter-
operability" in Article 6 of the Directive."0 Many industry people
assert that reverse engineering is a necessary requirement for
technological progress in the industry but that view was hotly
disputed in the deliberations over the Directive." The Preamble
also sanctions some reverse engineering in conjunction with the
use of a computer program by permitting such reproduction as is
consistent with "fair practice."' 2 Indirect support for the prac-
tice of reverse engineering may be inferred from the reference in
the Preamble to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.' 3 By
expressly preserving the supremacy of these latter treaty provi-
sions that restrict certain anti-competitive practices, as well as
the abuse of a "dominant [market] position" by a competitor,
the Directive may be interpreted as sanctioning reverse engi-
neering as an aspect of competition as required under Commu-
nity law. Despite these references, the Directive takes a restric-
tive view of reverse engineering.
I
Turning to substantive parts of the Directive, it is apparent
from the text of Article I that this provision resolves the conflict
tection of Computer Programs and its Implications in French Law, 14 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 28 (1992). For implications on German law, see Anthony Nolan, Brave New
World? Copyright Protection of Computer Programs in Germany & France in Light of
European Software Directive, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 121 (1991).
9. See infra pp. 743-48. See also Mindy J. Weichselbaum, Note, The EEC Directive
on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and the U.S. Copyright Law: Should
Copyright Law Permit Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs? 14 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1027 (1991).
10. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.
11. For an expression of this position by the Business Software Alliance, a trade
association of software manufacturers, see Michel Colombe & Caroline Meyer, Interoper-
ability Still Threatened by EC Software Directive: A Status Report, 9 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 325-26 (1990); see also Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of
Software: Separating Legal Mythology From Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331
(1992).
12. Johnson-Laird, supra note 11.
13. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.
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over the optimum intellectual property regime for the protection
of computer software. 14 By expressly selecting copyright law and
characterizing computer programs as literary works, the Direc-
tive effectively ends the discussion over sui generis protection
for programs. Despite the difficulty of adapting copyright doc-
trines to the protection of software programs, in part because of
the utilitarian and mechanical aspects of software programs, the
Directive is clear and unequivocal in its selection of copyright
law.15 In this approach, the Directive continues the position
taken in the earlier Green Paper and follows the pattern of the
United States and most member states of the Community. Over-
all, the Directive presents a series of compromises. Having re-
jected sui generis protection for software, it provides a frame-
work of interpretation of traditional copyright doctrines that
takes account of the essentially utilitarian nature of computer
programs.
Presumably, the preference for the copyright regime rather
than for protection by patent, trade secret, misappropriation, or
other means can be. justified by the recognized benefits of copy-
right. First, there is the low cost of obtaining protection immedi-
ately upon fixation of the work. Second, traditional copyright
doctrines serve well to protect subject matter that is distributed
in copies that may be cheaply and easily replicated."6 Finally,
the copyright regime affords a flexible framework within which
courts may strike a balance. between the scope of the right
holder's protection and the countervailing rights and interests of
users, competitors, and the public.
While the Directive has clearly foreclosed the possibility of
sui generis legislation in the Community, the possibility of pat-
ent protection of computer programs remains to a limited ex-
tent. Under the European Patent Convention, 17 the controlling
patent law of the Community, patent protection of computer
software is expressly excluded by Article 52.18 The force of this
14. Article I provides in material part, "In accordance with the provisions of this
Directive, Member States shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary
works with the meaning of the Berne Convention. . . ... Council Directive, supra note 1,
art. 1.
15. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Protection for Application Pro-
grams, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1072-79 (1989).
16. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction To The Law and Econom-
ics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 (1991).
17. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52, 13 I.L.M. 268 (1974).
18. Article 52(2) provides: "The following in particular shall not be regarded as in-
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position has, however, subsequently been qualified by Guidelines
for Examination in the European Patent Office (Guidelines).19
The Guidelines interpret Article 52 as a prohibition only against
patent protection of a computer software application program
standing alone. The Guidelines would permit patent protection
of an invention in which the computer program was an element.
As the Guidelines explain: "[I]f . .. the' subject matter as
claimed makes a technical contribution to the known art, pat-
entability should not be denied merely on the ground that a
computer program is involved in its implementation. '2 0
Subsequent case law limits the scope of patent protection of
software to inventions in which the software program is only an
ancillary feature." Presumably, the theory of restricting patent
protection of computer program algorithms, as such, is that the
program serves only to make an existing technology more effi-
cient. Under this analysis, there is patentable subject matter
only if there is a process that independently qualifies when the
computer program is removed from consideration.
While the scope of patent protection remains narrow, Arti-
cle 9(1) of the Directive provides, with uncertain effect, for pro-
tection of software under cognate branches of intellectual prop-
erty law. As the relationship between the Directive and the
European Patent Convention noted above illustrates, there is an
illusory aspect to the enabling language of Article 9(1). For, like
patents, the protection of semi-conductor products is one of the
ventions. . . . (c) schemes, rules and methods of performing mental acts, playing games,
or doing business, and computer programs." Council Directive, supra note 1, art.
52(2)(c).
This treaty, the European Patent Convention, supra note 17, was adopted by the
Community's nine member states in 1975 and is known as the Community Patent Con-
vention under which there is a single patent regime for all Community member states.
See Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, 15
I.L.M. 5.
19. See supra note 18.
20. Guidelines For Examination In the European Patent Office, Part C-IV, Sec. 2.
21. Case T26/88, Koch & Sterzel GmbH & Co. V. Siemens AG Philips Patentverwal-
tung GmbH Application, 2 E.P.O.R. 72 (1988). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has recently held that application of abstract mathematical reasoning
to a specific process may be patented. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. Article 9(1) provides in relevant part that nothing in the Directive shall
prejudice ". . . other legal provisions such as ... patent rights, trade-marks, unfair com-
petition, trade secrets, protection of semi-conductor products, or the law of contracts."
Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
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areas selected by the Community for harmonization.2" Accord-
ingly, the ability of a member state to protect semi-conductor
products will be circumscribed by the harmonization require-
ments of that Directive. Trade secret protection, unfair competi-
tion doctrines, and contractual arrangements, however, remain
'fully governed by the law of member states, since the Commu-
nity has not stated an intention to harmonize these bodies of
law.
With regard to contractual arrangements, however, there is
a qualification on the scope of national laws within the Software
Directive itself. Article 9(1) of the Directive places two con-
straints on contract rights relating to software. Under Article
9(1), a contract provision is null and void that undertakes to
limit the right of the user to decompile in order to achieve com-
patibility or to reproduce and study a protected program as part
of that objective.24 Similarly, there cannot be a valid contractual
provision restricting the right of a rightful owner to make a
back-up copy.25 Accordingly, attempts to use contracts of adhe-
sion to limit specific uses of computer programs will have little
scope in the Community.
One issue of potential conflict between the Directive and ex-
isting copyright legislation of some member States is the deter-
mination of the threshold of copyright protection. Under Article
1, the Directive grants protection to computer programs as liter-
ary works, a statement of a traditional copyright doctrine that
incorporates the concept of originality under the copyright laws
of the common law jurisdictions.2" In recognition of this inter-
pretation, Article 1(3) of the Directive provides a definition of
originality for purposes of the Directive that states the accepted
interpretation under the copyright law of the United States and
the United Kingdom.2 7 In so doing, the Directive poses an issue
of accommodation with the copyright laws of the Netherlands 28
and of France.29 The conflict might arise under Netherlands'
23. See Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Topographies of Semai-Con-
ductor Products, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36.
24. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
25. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). See infra note 29.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, Ch. I(1)(a) (1988).
28. See Meijboom, supra note 2, at 425.
29. See Meijboom, supra note 2, at 425; Anthony Nolan, Brave New World? Copy-
right Protection of Computer Programs in Germany and France in Light of European
Software Directive, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 121 (1991); Jane C. Ginsburg, French Copy-
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law, where there has been some pressure for protecting software
as a "writing," rather than as a "literary work. ' 30 As a writing, a
program could be eligible for copyright protection to some ex-
tent, even if the claimant merely reduced a program in circula-
tion to tangible form or produced a minor variation of it. Article
1(3) of the Directive states a higher requirement. Copyright pro-
tection may attach only if the program is the work product of
the author and that program reflects a modicum of intellectual
creativity.31
There is also a conflict between the threshold of protection
under the Directive and that of French copyright law. Under the
French Copyright Protection Amendment of 1985,32 protection
is given in a sui generis fashion to a distinct category of works
designated as "logiciels."' This special category requires no ele-
ment of intellectual creativity by the claimant.3 4 The Directive is
also at odds in this regard with German copyright law. As inter-
preted, German copyright law imposes a requirement of some
discernable achievement above that of the average computer
programmer in order for protection to attach. 5
In selecting the common law standard of originality for the
Community, the Directive provides a useful standard of con-
formity for the member states. The common law standard has
the feature of simplicity to commend it. Protection is estab-
lished on fixation so long as the work is that of the claimant, the
work as a whole consists of more than a trivial variation of ex-
isting material, and the work reflects some modicum of creative,
intellectual activity.38 An added advantage of the common law
right Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 269, 280-81 (1988).
30. See Meijboom, supra note 2, at 425.
31. See Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copy-
right Principles, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 125 (1990).
32. French Copyright Protection Amendment of 1985, C. Civ. art. 3 (87th ed. Dalloz
1982-1988).
33. See Nolan, supra note 29, at 146-50; Ginsburg, supra note 29.
34. See Meijboom, supra note 2, at 425.
35. See Inkassoprogram decision of May 9, 1985, GRUR no. 12, 1041 (1985) (Protec-
tion requires a strict standard of originality beyond that created by an average
programmer.).
36. One formulation under U.S. copyright law is that of Judge Jerome Frank in Al-
fred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). He wrote,
"Originality in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying." Id.
at 103. (quoting Hoague Sprague Corp. v. Frank Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir.
1929)). More recently the Supreme Court of the United States added some modicum of
creativity as a requisite in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct.
1282 (1991). In applying this new standard, Judge Newman wrote in Kregos v. The Asso-
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standard of originality is that it defined a fairly coherent body of
case law in the United States that can serve to illuminate margi-
nal issues.3 7 The functional significance of selecting this stan-
dard of originality is to protect software at minimal cost upon
completion of the work, thereby avoiding the expense and delay
associated with patent protection.
A further consequence of protecting software under copy-
right law is reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy.38 This
basic doctrine of copyright law serves in tandem with the con-
cept of "originality" to trim the scope of copyright protection
granted a right holder.' 9 Like Section 102(b) of the United
States Copyright Act, Article 1(2) of the Directive provides that
protection is limited "to the expression in . . .a computer pro-
gram." Also like Section 102(b), Article 1(2) bars protection for
"ideas and principles. '40
In contrast to rather settled case law defining "original," the
case law in the United States has not developed a clear direction
in making the idea/expression distinction with regard to
software.41 An early, flawed decision took the simplistic view
that there could be only one "idea" underlying a computer pro-
gram.42 Recent decisions reflect a better understanding of the
nature of software programs by taking account of the constitu-
ent elements of the program.43 This approach has the merit of
ciated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991), that the claimant of copyright protection
for a compilation would first have to "demonstrate originality. . .[and then] to demon-
strate that the selection was [insufficiently] creative." Id.
37. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (an-
nouncing the patterns test for distinguishing "idea" from "expression"). For a discussion
of the application of this test, see BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
48 (1966). See also Richard H. Stern, Copyright In Computer Programing Languages, 17
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321, 364-68 (1991) (describing inappropriate applica-
tion of this distinction in software cases).
38. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); L. Batlin
& Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976); Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 99.
39. Feist Publications, Inc. 111 S. Ct. at 1287 (no one may claim originality as to
facts).
40. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) and Council Directive, supra note 1, art.
1(2).
41. Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 311 (1992).
42. "The purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and
everything [else] ...would be part of the expression." Whelan Associates v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
43. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), afl'd, 1992 WL 139364 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
736 [Vol. XVIII:3
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facilitating the distinction between the expression and the un-
derlying idea in a software program by its focus on the struc-
tural elements of the program, e.g., the object and source code,
parameter lists, services required, and the general outline. From
this perspective, infringement may be determined by a series of
comparisons of these intrinsic features of the program, instead
of by matching amorphous, extrinsic criteria such as overall pur-
pose, structure, sequence, and organization. Since recent case
law seems to offer a workable judicial approach to the idea/ex-
pression determination, the reliance of the Directive on this ap-
proach offers a functional norm for national laws to follow.
Once the conditions and scope of protection are established
under Articles 1 and 2 of the Directive, attention is directed to
the identification of the right holder to complete the process of
copyright protection."" Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive address
the tangled issue of ownership." The traditional approach of
copyright law to this issue begins with the grant of the right to
the creative person when the expression in a work of authorship
is fixed in a tangible form.4 A corollary of this principle holds
that works prepared by employees in the course of their employ-
ment makes the employer the right holder.47 Within this frame-
work of polar alternatives, troublesome characterization
problems have arisen where the creative person is neither an
employee nor an independent creative person. The most trouble-
some cases involve one person commissioning another to prepare
a protected work in which fundamental aspects of the design
and some supervision are provided by the commissioning
person.48
Article 2 of the Directive states the basic principle that the
copyright belongs to the creative person, except where the per-
son is an employee hired for the creative task or under instruc-
tion of the employer.49 The Directive takes the position in the
employer/employee cases, that the employer (natural person or
No. 92-15655, 1992 WL 293141 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1992).
44. Council Directive, supra note 1, arts. 1 & 2.
45. Council Directive, supra note 1, arts. 2 & 3.
46. Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 867 (1989).
47. I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment: What Congress Really
Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 210 (1988).
48. See, e.g., Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
(sculptor given detailed instructions of design of statue).
49. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 2.
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entity) is the right holder as to the economic rights.50 Presuma-
bly, the moral rights of the author are not affected and may re-
main subject to national law. The Directive also leaves the iden-
tification of the right holder in the cases involving various
contractual arrangements outside the employment relationship
to the national law of member states. The Article accordingly
provides in Article 2(1) that: "The author of a computer pro-
gram shall be the natural person or group of natural persons
who has created the program or, where the legislation of the
Member State permits, the legal person designated as the right
holder by that legislation."'51 Article 2(1) serves as a statement of
general principles, the application of which are to be imple-
mented by the law of each member state. Article 3 cedes effec-
tive determination of ownership to national law as follows: "Pro-
tection shall be granted to all natural or legal persons eligible
under national copyright legislation as applied to literary
works."5 2
In addition, Article 2 recognizes the existence of collective
and joint works, also leaving the determination of these relation-
ships to national law.53 Overall, the Directive provides a compre-
hensible statement of general principles for the identification of
the right holder or right holders, leaving the precise elements of
the employment or contractual relationship to national law. Pro-
grammers as employees will not be right holders, but may use
contractual arrangements to retain some aspects of ownership or
of attribution. Users who commission programs can invoke na-
tional law to determine ownership rights and may rely upon con-
tractual arrangements to allocate ownership.
As member states undertake the task of harmonizing na-
tional laws with the Directive, there should be no significant
conflict over the ownership issues. Some adjustment in the na-
tional law of some member states may be required on account of
the reference in Article 2(3) granting only the economic rights to
the employer, presumably leaving moral rights subject to na-
tional law.54 Since Article 1 makes reference to protecting com-
puter software as literary works "within the meaning of the
50. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(3).
51. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
52. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 3.
53. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(1) recognizes collective works; Council
Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(2) recognizes joint works.
54. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(3).
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Berne Convention," the obligation is imposed on national laws
of member states to protect both the rights of paternity and of
integrity.55
The core provisions of the Directive.are in Articles 4 and 5,
which are concerned with granting the right holder three tradi-
tional intellectual property rights: 1) the right of reproduction;
2) the right to make derivative works; and, 3) the right of distri-
bution, including rental rights.5 Following the traditional statu-
tory format of copyright, the Directive grants these rights in Ar-
ticle 4, but qualifies them in Article 5." Article 4(a) grants the
exclusive right of reproduction in terms expressly directed to
computer programs as "the right to do or authorize. . . the per-
manent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by
any means and in any form, in part or in whole. '58 Unlike many
national copyright laws, the Directive expressly addresses the
scope of the right in the context of computer usage, by providing
that: "Insofar as loading, displaying, running, transmission or
storage of the computer program necessitate such reproduction,
such acts shall be subject to authorization of the right holder. ' 59
This broad grant of entitlement to the right holder is, how-
ever, materially qualified by the limitation of Article 5(1) which
relieves the user of the need to obtain permission from the right
holder either to reproduce the program or make a derivative
work from it where these acts are "necessary for the use of the
computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its
intended purpose, including for error correction. 6 0 Similarly,
Article 5(2) stresses the primacy of the user's rights over those
of the right holder where there is a claim of functional need by
the user.6 Article 5(2) thus implements the needs of users of
computer programs announced in the Preamble of the Direc-
tive. 2 In addition, Article 5(2) grants the rightful owner of a
55. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.
56. Council Directive, supra note 1, arts. 4 & 5.
57. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.
58. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
59. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
60. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
61. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
62. The Preamble states: "Whereas the exclusive rights of the author to prevent the
unauthorized reproduction of his work have to be subject to a limited exception in the
case of a computer program to allow the reproduction technically necessary for the use
of that program by the lawful acquirer." Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. (empha-
sis added).
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program the unconditional right to make an archival copy, 3 as
will the right to correct program errors, subject to limitations
stated in a license.
Qualifying the reproduction and derivative work rights on
grounds of technical necessity is a constructive attempt to adapt
the doctrine of fair use64 to computer software. This theme of
qualifying the rights granted by the Directive by the uses to
which computer programs are put is also reflected in the section
of the Preamble which refers to interoperability as a significant
role for computer programs.6 By these references, the Directive
provides a perspective for interpretation to national legislatures
and to judges in defining the scope of protection of programs.
These parts of the Preamble coalesce with the limiting portions
of Article 5 to emphasize the utilitarian nature of computer pro-
grams. These provisions serve, for example, to guide the inter-
pretation of national laws in the direction of "thin protection"
for the non-literal features of computer programs and interfaces.
In these provisions, the Directive stresses a sensitivity toward
the end use of the program."
The Preamble further urges that the reproduction right be
interpreted restrictively where copying of a program can be
shown to be associated with achieving interoperability As
though to reinforce the significance of interoperability as an
added emphasis on the functional nature of computer programs,
the Preamble adds the element of "fair practice." In the para-
graph following the reference to interoperability, the Directive
states that the user may reproduce without permission if the use
63. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
64. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1986);
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its 'Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
65. The Preamble states, "the function of a computer program is to communicate
and work together with other components of a computer system and with users,. . . and
where appropriate, physical interconnection and interaction is required to permit all ele-
ments, of software and hardware to work with other software and hardware... in all
ways in which they are intended to function." Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
(emphasis added).
66. See Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl, & art. 5.
67. The Preamble states in part, "Whereas,. . . circumstances may exist when such
a reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of Article 4(a)
and (b) are indispensable to obtain the necessary information to achieve the interoper-
ability of an independently created program with other programs." Council Directive,
supra note 1, pmbl.
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can be deemed "legitimate and compatible with fair practice."68
The significance of the perspective taken in the Directive
may be illustrated by applying the clutch of references in the
Preamble and Articles 4 and 5 as the basis of decision in the
controversial Whelan case.69 There, the court found infringe-
ment of a program written in EDL for an IBM Series One com-
puter by a program written in Basic for an IBM PC. Resting its
decision on substantial similarity of non-literal aspects of the
programs, the court relied on the amorphous, extrinsic con-
structs of "structure, sequence, and organization. '70
Were this case to arise within a member state whose copy-
right law had been conformed to this Directive, the outcome
most likely would be different. Under the Directive, inquiry is
focused on function and on interoperability at the outset. In the
Whelan case, the court gave no consideration to compatibility or
interoperability of computer programs.71 Moreover, the Pream-
ble's reference to "fair practice" would put into the decisional
balance the breach of trust element in the Whelan case, an ele-
ment which was also ignored by the trial court.7 2 In the actual
case, there was a prior, lapsed commissioning arrangement be-
tween the parties, during which the defendant employed a de-
ceitful ruse to obtain the source code of the contested program.7 3
While reproduction and derivative work rights are set out in
the Directive in express recognition of the utilitarian nature of
the computer program, as noted above, the distribution right
granted by Article 4(c) is stated in more traditional terms. Like
most national copyright laws, the Directive adopts the exhaus-
tion principle which ends the statutory grant of protection to
the right holder on the occasion of the first sale of the protected
article.7 4 The Directive also incorporates current legislation by
preserving the rental right for the original owner beyond the
first sale, as was recently done in the United States.7 5 The Direc-
68. Council Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
69. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. Id. at 1248.
71. Id.
72. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
73. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232.
74. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(c).
75. Under United States copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988), the right holder is
granted the distribution right, including the sale, rental, lease, loan, or other transfer of
ownership. However, section 109(a) qualifies the grant of section 106(3) by permitting
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tive states the exhaustion doctrine with the exception of rental
of software in Article 4(c) as.follows: "The first sale in the Com-
munity of a copy of a program by the right holder . .. shall
exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that
copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of
the program or a copy thereof. '7 6
The Directive also makes a constructive contribution to the
developing law of computer program protection by recognizing
the distinctive role of user interfaces in the marketing of com-
mercial application programs. Under United States copyright
law, the scope of protection for the interface has taken a mean-
dering course in the courts. A cluster of decisions reflect a less
than full recognition of the role of the interface as providing
"user friendly" access to the program, as a material element in
successful marketing."7 Generally, the United States courts have
been less than fully sensitive to the nature and function of pro-
gram interfaces, tending to ignore the utilitarian and standardi-
zation aspects of command structures, command terms, and the
organization of menus.78 These cases have generated a body of
criticism urging limited protection for interfaces. 79 These com-
mentators stress the need for recognition of the functional role
of the interface in both the use and marketing of application
programs.8 0 Greater judicial awareness is also urged of the need
for standardization that drives the design of interfaces toward
the purchaser to sell or otherwise dispose of the purchased copy of the protected work.
Vendors of computer programs asked Congress for legislation to end the practice of com-
mercial software rental. Congress responded in the Computer Software Rental Amend-
ments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). Under 17 U.S.C. § 109(b),
the right holder may prohibit rental, lease, or lending for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, notwithstanding a prior sale. Non-profit educational institutions
and libraries are exempt from this restriction.
76. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(c).
77. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222; Lotus Development Corp. v. Barland Int'l, Inc., 788
F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992).
78. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass.
1990) (finding that menu structure, command terms and structure of interface are in-
fringed by a defendant's compatible spreadsheet; rejecting argument of standardization
as word play); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.
Cal. 1986)..
79. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 41; Richard H. Stern, Legal Protection of
Screen Displays & Other User Interfaces for Computers: A Problem in Balancing In-
centives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to the Utilitarian, 14 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 283 (1990); Peter S. Mehell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer
Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329 (1987); see text accompanying note 43.
80. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 79, at 283.
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common features accepted by the public.81
The Directive offers guidance for the scope of interface pro-
tection in Article 1(2) as follows: "[I]deas and principles which
underlie any element of a computer program, including those
which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright
under this Directive. 8 2 Coupled with the originality require-
ment incorporated in Article 1(1), this provision suggests that a
successful user interface utilizing commonly accepted command
terms in its menu may receive little, if any, copyright protection
under national law in conformity with the Directive.
A material qualification of the right holder's reproduction
right is reflected in Article 5(3). Although the phrase "reverse
engineering" does not appear, the Article effectively grants sub-
stantial reproduction rights to the user, free of authorization by
the right holder, in order to determine and study the constituent
elements and the underlying ideas. Thus, this Article provides
that: "The person having a right to use a copy of a computer
program shall be entitled, without authorization of the
rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the pro-
gram in order to determine ideas and principles which underlie
any element of the program .. . 83 Taking Article 5 together
with Article 6, which permits decompilation, completes the grant
of limited reverse engineering rights under the Directive. Article
6 deprives the right holder of her reproductive right where "re-
production of the code and translation of . . . [the program's]
form are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to
achieve interoperability." 4
It is a fair inference that the hammer marks of compromise
account for the omission of an express reference to "reverse en-
gineering" and that these several qualifying provisions are part
of a compromise of this contested issue. For example, the grant-
ing language of Article 5 is circumscribed by limiting phrases as
to the scope of unauthorized reproduction for study or testing as
follows: "[The study or testing is done] while performing any of
the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing
81. See Stern, supra note 79; Samuelson, supra note 41.
For an economic analysis of standardization considerations for new products, see
Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986).
82. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
83. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
84. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
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the program . . . which . . . [the user] is entitled to do." '85 In
addition to these limitations on the reproduction right, the user
is given further power to reproduce the code and form of a pro-
tected program by Article 6, entitled, "Decompilation." 8 This
Article broadly grants the user the right to invade any of the
rights given by Article 4(a) and (b) without authorization if such
reproduction is "indispensable to obtain the information neces-
sary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs. 8 7
The selection of the term, "decompilation," rather than "re-
verse engineering" reflects the depth of disagreement over the
scope of this right. To some, the term suggests one aspect of
reverse engineering. Others involved in the debate over the Di-
rective consider the term "decompilation," which is not defined
in the Directive, to have only the restricted meaning stated in
the Directive.8 The overall emphasis of the Directive on facili-
tating the development of functionally compatible computer
programs poses a central policy issue for copyright professionals.
Decompilation, a procedure by which the high-level language of
a computer program is derived from the machine language, in-
volves at least a partial reproduction or preparation of a deriva-
tive work of the protected program. Discerning the high-level
language is often necessary to achieve functional compatibility.
However, this information at the same time provides the basis
for the preparation of a competing product. The difficult policy
issue is where the line of infringement is to be drawn.8"
The Directive restricts permissible reverse engineering by a
series of conditions contained in Article 6. For example, Article
6(1)(a) restricts decompilation initially to a user lawfully in pos-
session of the protected program.90 Thus, a thief would not be
85. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
86. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.
87. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.
88. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Finding A Balance: Computer
Software, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of Technological Change, OTA-
TCT-527 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1992) [hereinafter
OTA].
89. The problem has been characterized as follows: "Decompilation of a computer
program does not provide an imitator with just a good start in producing a competing
product; it gives him virtually everything necessary to produce a functionally identical
product." William T. Lake et al., Tampering With Fundamentals: A Critique of Pro-
posed Changes in EC Software Protection, 6 THE COMPUTER LAW. 3 (1989); see also
Johnson-Laird, supra note 11.
90. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(a).
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entitled to decompile a stolen program. Article 6(1)(b) further
restricts decompiling a protected program to circumstances in
which the purpose is achieving interoperability and the requisite
information has not been "made readily available." Uncertainty
as to the meaning of availability in this context makes this con-
dition a potential trap for the unwary decompiler. If the phrase
"readily available" is interpreted to mean available on request
from the right holder and upon terms and conditions imposed
by the right holder, then the right to decompile is materially re-
stricted, assuming the goal of achieving interoperability.91
The recent report by the Office of Technology Assessment
(the Report) notes the unsettled meaning of the phrase, "readily
available. '9 2 Given the uncertain interpretation of availability, a
program owner undertaking to decompile a protected program
risks an action for infringement. In this case, the decompiler has
the burden of showing the unavailability of the desired code.
Under the restrictive interpretation of "readily available," the
right holder would prevail upon a showing that it was prepared
to disclose the desired code had there been a request for it. The
less restrictive interpretation of availability would impose on the
decompiler only the burden of researching a variety of potential
sources, possibly in obscure languages and locations, as well as in
public domain material. Subject to subsequent refinement of
"availability," decompiling with authorization may be
actionable.
Article 6(1)(c) further restricts the scope of permissible
decompilation by the requirement that acts of decompilation
and reproduction of a protected program are limited to those
parts of the original program essential to achieving interoper-
ability. This requirement is designed to bar the production of
competing programs by imposing on the decompiler the duty of
showing that the matter sought was essential to an indepen-
dently created program that would connect to the program being
decompiled. Absent a showing of such connection to the decom-
piled program, the acts of reproduction would constitute in-
fringement. This limitation serves as a caution against full scale
decompiling of an entire program. Such a record may serve as an
evidentiary predicate for negating the stated goal of achieving
interoperability.
91. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(b).
92. See OTA, supra note 88, at 119 n.151.
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If any further proof is needed of the success of the oppo-
nents of reverse engineering in formulating this Directive, it may
be found in Article 6(2). This second part of Article 6 reinforces
the narrowing conditions of Article 6(1) by imposing a series of
further limitations on the use of the code obtained by decompil-
ing.93 Article 6(2)(a) reiterates the constraint of achieving inter-
operability under Article 6(1)(c) and implies that the interoper-
ability that is the goal, means interoperability between the
newly-modified, independent program and the decompiled pro-
gram. Thus, Article 6(2)(a) states that the information obtained
by decompiling shall not "be used for goals other than to achieve
interoperability of the independently created computer pro-
gram."94 As the Report notes, an earlier draft of the Directive
contained an express reference to interoperability as requiring a
connection between the independently created program and the
decompiled program. The Report cites a communication of the
Commission to the effect that the absence of the express refer-
ence in the final version of the Directive was not intended to
change the requirement of direct connection. 5 Accordingly, a
newly created program using code contained by decompiling a
protected program would be infringing, if the preparer failed to
show a connection of interoperability between the new program
and the subject program of decompilation. Presumably, a newly
created program that was distributed in competition with the
decompiled program would be infringing even if the former were
technologically superior, but bore some material resemblance to
the code of the latter. A finding of infringement would most
surely result if the decompiler were unable to sustain the burden
of showing an interoperable connection between the decompiled
program and the newly created one in terms of the specific code
taken. Article 6(2)(b) serves to underscore the narrow scope of
interoperability stated in Article 6(2)(a) by barring the transfer
of technology from one decompiled code to another decompiled
code, other than to accomplish the kind of interoperability be-
tween the two programs required by Article 6(2)(a).
Article 6(2)(c) contains the final limitation on the use of
decompiled information, stating that this information cannot be
used for "the development, production or marketing of a com-
93. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
94. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)(a).
95. See OTA, supra note 88, at 120 n.152.
[Vol. XVIII:3
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
puter program substantially similar in its expression, or for any
other act which infringes copyright."96 There is the negative im-
plication in this section that a newly developed program con-
taining decompiled code that was not substantially similar in ex-
pression might not infringe. However, this provision is not likely
to become a gateway for unrestricted reverse engineering. A
newly developed program containing small amounts of decom-
piled code and marketed in competition with the decompiled
program would remain impaled on the narrow interpretation of
interoperability stated in Article 6(2)(a) and (b), notwithstand-
ing the lack of "substantial similarity in its expression." This
latter requirement may, however, offer shelter to some programs,
resulting from decompilation undertaken to achieve interoper-
ability, that fail in that goal. If that effort affords an opportunity
for the subsequent development of an unrelated program that is
marketable and bears no similarity to the decompiled program,
the resultant program may not be infringing. In these circum-
stances, the decompiler may be found to have taken no more
than an idea from the protected program.
In Article 6(3), the final part of this Article, there is the re-
minder that Berne Convention requirements are to be taken into
account in interpreting this Article.
Having defined the basis, scope, and conditions of protec-
tion in the first six Articles, the Directive addresses the issue of
remedies in Article 7. The approach of the Directive is to leave
the traditional battery of copyright remedies to existing national
laws, while imposing only a few requirements on national laws.
Accordingly, Article 7(1) would require national law to provide
"appropriate remedies" for knowingly distributing an infringing
copy and for possessing an infringing copy with a view toward
commercially distributing it.97 In Article 7(1)(c), the Directive
departs from many national copyright laws by making illegal the
possession and commercial distribution of a program to unlock a
protective feature of an existing copyrighted program. 8
The Directive adds one further requirement to the national
laws of member states - the remedy of seizure. Under Articles
7(2) and 7(3), any infringing copy of a protected program may
be seized, and member states should provide in their laws for
96. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2)(c).
97. Council Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b).
98. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(c).
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seizure of any "means" used for the unauthorized removal of a
protective device from a protected program. 99 Presumably, the
power of seizure would be limited to those programs, in
whatever form, that accomplish the unauthorized removal of
protective devices, but would not extend to the hardware em-
ployed to generate the tainted unlocking programs.
In its treatment of internal security devices, the Directive
takes a more "protectionist" position than does the case law in
the United States. There, the legality of such devices rests on
the determination of whether the unlocking device infringes the
protected program by invading either the reproduction right or
the derivative work right of the original program.1°°
After providing for remedies, the Directive addresses the
duration of the term of protection in Article 8. The basic term
prescribed by the Directive is in conformity with the Berne Con-
vention, which provides protection for the life of the author plus
fifty years.101 For all works where the author is either unknown
or a corporate entity, the Directive provides a term for fifty
years from the date of initial distribution. 0 2 Where national law
differs from the norm of the Directive by providing a longer
term of protection, the Directive is permissive. Such provisions
may continue according to Article 8(2), which provides: "Mem-
ber states which already have a term of protection longer than
that provided for. . .[above] are allowed to maintain their pre-
sent term until such time as the term of protection for copyright
works is harmonized by Community law in a more general
way.' 1 03 Presumably, terms of protection under the national
laws of member states that exceed the norm set by the Directive
will be tolerated for an unstated period, but terms shorter than
the norm will not be accepted.
In this matter, the Directive seems perverse. The traditional
duration of copyright protection is incongruent with the com-
mercial life of computer programs. Given the rapid rate of
change in the technology of both hardware and software, a ten-
year term would be more appropriate. Perhaps the longer term
99. Council Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(2) and 7(3).
100. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987); af'd, 847
F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that it is not an infringement of protected program to
prepare an unlocking program without copying the original).
101. See supra note 6.
102. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
103. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
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is a cost of relying on the copyright regime for protection. The
origin of the longer term reflects the historical experience with
belles lettres and fine arts. The model of the impecunious and
improvident author or painter, however, is not representative of
software designers.
Article 9 undertakes to preserve the application of alterna-
tive legal regimes to the protection of software programs. Thus,
Article 9(1) states: "The provisions of this Directive shall be
without prejudice to any other legal provision such as those con-
cerning patent rights, trade-marks, unfair competition, trade
secrets, protection of semiconductor products or the law of con-
tracts." 104 As noted earlier, the full force of these cognate re-
gimes of protection are not as complete as this Article states. 105
Thus, member states do not have full discretion to legislate re-
garding semiconductor products because the Council issued a
Directive in 1987 concerning this subject. 0 6 As to contract reme-
dies, Article 9(1) itself limits the scope of contract law from ap-
plication to issues of decompilation, reproduction to make a
back-up copy, and reproduction to study or test to determine
underlying program ideas. The last sentence of Article 9(1) ex-
pressly states: "Any contractual provisions contrary to Article 6
[decompilation] or to the exceptions provided for in Article 5(2)
[back-up copy] and 5(3) [reproduce without permission to study
and test] shall be null and void.' 0 7
Only trademark, unfair competition, and trade secret doc-
trines remain outside the scope of the Directive. The restriction
on contract law would presumably deprive shrink-wrap licenses
of any efficacy, but may, for example, permit the use of contracts
to limit the subscribers of electronic databases from reproducing
and distributing copyrighted material.
The final Article, Article 10, sets January 1, 1993 as the ef-
fective date for conformity of the national copyright laws of the
member states to the Directive.
CONCLUSION
This Directive makes a significant contribution to the devel-
opment of copyright law as applied to computer programs. Per-
104. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.
105. See supra pp. 5-6.
106. See supra note 23.
107. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
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sons concerned with this area of the law may view it as provid-
ing a middle ground between copyright and sui generis
protection. By expressly taking account of the nature and use of
computer programs, the Directive provides an occasion for a re-
view of copyright principles as applied to computer programs.
The innovations of the Directive with regard to decompilation
and interfaces offer guidance to these difficult areas. Accord-
ingly, the Directive warrants the attention of all concerned with
the development of copyright law. Its substantive import has ra-
diations beyond the European Community.
